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ATKINS V. VIRGINIA: LESSONS FROM SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REGULATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Carol S. Steiker* and Jordan M. Steiker**
In its first two decades regulating capital punishment in the modern
era, the U.S. Supreme Court focused primarily on procedure rather
than substance.' The broad attack on the death penalty in the 1960s
and early 1970s had both substantive and procedural dimensions. 2
Death penalty opponents claimed that the punishment itself was ex-
cessively cruel and inconsistent with evolving standards of decency.
They also argued that state death penalty systems lacked basic proce-
dural safeguards to ensure that the punishment, if retained, would be
applied in a consistent, nondiscriminatory manner. In response to
these claims, the Court insisted that states rewrite their statutes to
guide sentencer discretion 3 while also preserving some meaningful
consideration of mitigating evidence. 4 Additionally, the Court
adopted rules intended to limit unfair or discriminatory selection of
* Howard J. and Katherine W. Aibel Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
** Cooper K. Ragan Regents Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. We
thank Meghan Shapiro for her helpful research assistance. We also thank Andrea Lyon and the
editors of the DePaul Law Review for helpful comments and for organizing this thought-provok-
ing symposium.
1. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV L. REv. 355, 402-03
(1995).
2. MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT 60-72 (1973) (describing death penalty opponents' strategy leading up to Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), as a plan to attack the death penalty on procedural grounds with
hopes of gaining ground on a substantive assault against the death penalty).
3. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976) ("Under Florida's capital-sentencing proce-
dures, in sum, trial judges are given specific and detailed guidance to assist them in deciding
whether to impose a death penalty or imprisonment for life."). In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court
stated the following:
[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an
arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures
that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance .... [I]t is
possible to construct capital-sentencing systems capable of meeting Furman's constitu-
tional concerns.
428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (citing Furman, 408 U.S. 238).
4. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating a mandatory death pen-
alty statute on grounds that it foreclosed individualized consideration of the offender and
offense).
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capital jurors5 and required some heightened standards in capital
cases to enhance the reliability of capital sentencing. 6 At the same
time, the Court generally rejected efforts to impose significant sub-
stantive limits on the imposition of the death penalty, either through
total abolition or enforceable proportionality limits7 or through judi-
cial policing of the outcomes of the death penalty system.,
The proceduralization of American death penalty law might be re-
garded as appropriately reflecting the Court's institutional strengths
and limitations. The Court's expertise and authority are at their
height when the Court focuses on the design and implementation of
procedures within the framework of the criminal justice system.9 In
contrast, substantive assessments by the Court-such as whether a
form of punishment is excessive in itself or disproportionate in light of
the characteristics of an offense and offender-draw the Court into
more difficult and controversial terrain. Indeed, given the Court's fo-
cus on the evolving standards of contemporary society in crafting pro-
portionality limits on the death penalty, regulating the substantive
reach of the American death penalty moves the Court toward political
and social anthropology and away from the more familiar territory of
criminal procedure.
Nonetheless, looking at the two decades of constitutional regulation
of the death penalty post-Furman, we previously argued that the ex-
cessively procedural focus on American death penalty law had
wrought the worst of all possible worlds. 10 The Court's intricate pro-
cedural doctrines did little to enhance the reliability or fairness of the
American death penalty, yet the expensive, time-consuming litigation
5. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (regulating the practice of death-qualifying
juries by insisting that states could not strike for cause all jurors who harbored some conscien-
tious reservations about the death penalty).
6. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (invalidating limits on defense-spon-
sored testimony regarding the unavailability of parole in cases where the prosecution empha-
sized the prospective dangerousness of the defendant); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320
(1985) (limiting prosecutorial efforts to diminish jurors' sense of responsibility for their verdict
based on an inaccurate characterization of the scope of appellate review); Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349 (1977) (requiring heightened procedural protections at the sentencing phase to
ensure accuracy of information offered in support of imposing a death sentence).
7. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (re-
jecting the argument that the death penalty is disproportionate as applied to offenders with
mental retardation); Tison v. Arizona. 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (limiting proportionality protections
for non-triggerpersons sentenced to death).
8. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting the claim that the demonstrable
role of race-particularly the race of the victim-in capital sentencing renders the death penalty
impermissibly arbitrary in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
9. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 1, at 407.
10. Id. at 438.
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wrought by such procedures gave the appearance of intensive, mean-
ingful regulation.1" We worried that the complicated web of legal
rules gave unjustified legitimacy to a death penalty system that still
operated in an arbitrary, discriminatory, and disproportionate man-
ner.12 We also argued that the Court had missed several opportunities
to address the underlying concerns about the arbitrary, discrimina-
tory, and disproportionate use of the death penalty by imposing signif-
icant substantive limitations on its reach. 13 In our view, forbidding the
imposition of the death penalty against certain offenders would pro-
vide a meaningful limitation on the death penalty and would not risk
exacerbating the "legitimation" problem created by highly visible, yet
highly ineffectual, procedural safeguards.
Over the past five years, the Court has reversed earlier decisions
and embraced the sort of substantive constraints on capital punish-
ment that we had endorsed-forbidding the imposition of the death
penalty against juveniles offenders 14 and offenders with mental retar-
dation. 15 Although these decisions pointed to some objectively dis-
cernible measures of growing public concerns about executing such
offenders, they also reflected the movement toward a methodological
approach more hospitable to substantive regulation of the death pen-
alty. In both cases, a minority of death penalty states forbade the
challenged practice,1 6 yet the Court relied upon the direction and
speed of change toward prohibition and other, nonlegislative indicia
of contemporary values (expert and international opinion, among
other things) in discerning an emerging consensus that such execu-
tions were excessive. 17
The implementation of the juvenile ban involves no difficult cases,
and there has been virtually no litigation surrounding it: offenders
who committed the crime before turning eighteen have had their
sentences commuted via judicial or clemency proceedings. At least
one state expressed deep dissatisfaction with the Court's decision, but
such disappointment was not accompanied by defiance of the man-
11. Id. at 426-38.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 415-21 (outlining possible substantive regulation).
14. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
15. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2003).
16. At the time of Atkins, eighteen death penalty states prohibited the execution of offenders
with mental retardation. Id. at 313-15. At the time of Simmons, eighteen death penalty states
prohibited execution of persons under eighteen at the time of the crime. 543 U.S. at 564.
17. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 565-78 (referencing professional evaluations of juveniles' culpabili-
ties and discussing international opinion of the juvenile death penalty); see also Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 316-18 & n.21 (discussing expert opinions of mental retardation and culpability and referring
to disapproval of the "world community").
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date. 18 The ban on executing persons with mental retardation, on the
other hand, has spawned extensive, intricate, and bitterly contested
litigation. Although states have differed marginally in their defini-
tions of mental retardation-some have embraced evidentiary pre-
sumptions for IQ scores at or below 65,19 70,20 or 75,21 and others have
adopted no numeric standard 22-there appears to be remarkable
agreement about a "core" definition of mental retardation. But this
"core" is more of a standard than a rule; thus, there is frequent disa-
greement about whether the exemption applies in particular cases.
I. PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING MENTAL RETARDATION:
IMPLEMENTATION OR EVASION?
The greatest variation among states exists in the procedures used to
determine whether a defendant is mentally retarded, including
whether the ultimate decisionmaker should be judge or jury,23
whether the state or the defendant should bear the burden of proof,2 4
18. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Alabama v. Adams, 2006 WL 979273 (U.S. Mar. 22,
2006) (No. 05-1309) (presenting the question of "[w]hether this Court should reconsider its deci-
sion in Roper v. Simmons").
19. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(a)(2) (2007) (establishing a rebuttable presumption
of mental retardation when the defendant's IQ is 65 or below).
20. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130(2) (LexisNexis 2006) MD. CODE ANN. CRIM.
LAW § 2-202(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-105.01(3) (LexisNexis 2007);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1(A) (LexisNexis 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(a)(1)(c)
(2007).
21. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/114-15 (LexisNexis 2007) (in Illinois, an IQ of 75 or
below is presumptive evidence of mental retardation).
22. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101(2) (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(a)(3)
(2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(e) (2007); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030(6) (2007).
23. For example, Delaware and Virginia require a jury determination of mental retardation.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(3) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (2007). In con-
trast, Idaho and Nevada require the judge to determine mental retardation. IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 19-2515A (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.098 (LexisNexis 2007). North Carolina and
Oklahoma allow for determination by either a judge or a jury, but specify different burdens of
proof for each. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10b (2007).
24. States vary regarding the standard of proof as well. For example, Mississippi, South Caro-
lina, and Washington place the burden on the defendant by preponderance of evidence. Chase
v. State, 873 So. 2d 1013, 1029 (Miss. 2004); Franklin v. Maynard, 588 S.E.2d 604, 606 (S.C. 2003);
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (LexisNexis 2007). In contrast, Arizona and Delaware place the
burden on the defendant by clear and convincing evidence. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02
(2007): DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(3). Georgia places the burden on the defendant to
establish mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(a)(3). In
California cases predating the state legislation, it appears that the burden is on the state. See,
e.g., In re Young, No. S115318, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 12452, at *1 (Cal. Oct. 11, 2006) ("The Director
of the Department of Corrections ... is ordered to show cause ... why petitioner's death sen-
tence should not be vacated ... on the ground that he is mentally retarded within the meaning of
Atkins .... ").
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and whether the determination should be made pretrial or post-trial.2 5
For those already sentenced to death, states differ in what triggers ei-
ther a right to resources for further developing a mental retardation
claim or a right to an evidentiary hearing. Further, they differ regard-
ing whether claims of ineligibility based on mental retardation are
defaultable. 26
In Atkins, the Court explicitly left to the states the means of imple-
menting the ban: "As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright with
regard to insanity, 'we leave to the States the task of developing ap-
propriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon their exe-
cution of sentences."' 2 7  But, by essentially deregulating the
procedural means of enforcing the substantive right, the Court has un-
dermined the goals of the underlying ban by creating a substantial risk
of false negatives. This risk is especially great in jurisdictions where
the determination of mental retardation is made by the same jurors
who have already determined that the defendant should be sentenced
to death (or by a judge after an advisory sentence of death)2 8 and in
jurisdictions that impose other significant obstacles to a finding of
mental retardation, such as a "beyond a reasonable doubt" or "clear
and convincing" standard of proof borne by the defendant,2 9 exces-
sively stringent provisions for litigating mental retardation claims in
postconviction fora (including threshold rules for funding and eviden-
tiary hearings), or evidentiary rules that permit prejudicial considera-
tions (for instance, the manner in which the crime was committed) to
play a significant role in the assessment of mental retardation. 30
25. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (providing for pre-sentencing determination); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 174.098, 175.554 (detailing separate procedures for claims brought pretrial, during
trial, or post-trial); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (specifying that the determination take place
pretrial if made by a judge, but during sentencing if by jury); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-
26.2 (2007) (requiring pretrial determination).
26. Georgia defendants who do not raise mental retardation at trial may raise the claim in a
habeas petition under the miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default. See, e.g., Head
v. Ferrell, 554 S.E.2d 155 (Ga. 2001). However, the habeas court may not "revisit jury verdicts
on mental retardation and order different results." Head v. Stripling, 590 S.E.2d 122, 128 (Ga.
2003); see also Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2007); Schofield v. Palmer, 621
S.E.2d 726, 731 (Ga. 2005).
27. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2003) (citation omitted) (quoting Ford v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986)).
28. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(4) (LexisNexis 2007) (leaving the determination to
the judge after a jury's advisory death verdict); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (2007) (leaving
the mental retardation determination to the jury).
29. Arizona and Delaware place the burden on the defendant by clear and convincing evi-
dence. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(3). Georgia places the
burden on the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(a)(3).
30. See, e.g., Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (utilizing a judicially
created test for mental retardation that explicitly requires focus on the defendant's behavior
725
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Both pre- and post-Atkins litigation has demonstrated the ways in
which statutory or court-imposed procedural obstacles can impair the
underlying prohibition against executing persons with mental retarda-
tion. In Georgia, for example, placing the burden of establishing
mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt on defendants cer-
tainly limits the effectiveness of the prohibition. Georgia adopted its
ban after the notorious execution of Jerome Bowden, an inmate with
mental retardation, who was denied clemency notwithstanding his sig-
nificant impairment (Bowden reportedly could not count to ten). 3'
The net effect of the high burden Georgia imposes on defendants is
that disagreement among experts will invariably support a finding
against the defendant. 32 There is some irony in Georgia's simultane-
ous status as the first state to ban the practice and the state that im-
poses the highest burden to establish mental retardation. Other
states, via statute or judicial decision, have rejected the Georgia stan-
dard, some doing so explicitly on constitutional grounds. In Ken-
tucky, for example, the state supreme court concluded that it could
not impose a burden above the preponderance standard in its imple-
mentation of the state's prohibition against executing "seriously men-
tally retarded" offenders.33 The Kentucky court, analogizing to the
issue of incompetency, held that the beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard was inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of
Oklahoma's requirement that defendants establish their incompetency
by clear and convincing evidence. 34
Some jurisdictions have sought to ensure that the mental retarda-
tion determination is not divorced from the underlying facts of the
offense notwithstanding the possible prejudice of tying that determi-
nation to the death penalty decision. The effort to connect the crime
to the assessment of mental retardation occurs on two levels: the tim-
ing of the decision and the permissible evidentiary bases for establish-
ing or, more commonly, rebutting deficits in adaptive behavior.
during the crime). A related hurdle exists in many states that require the presence of mental
retardation "at the time of the offense." See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 163 S.w.3d 333, 356 (Ark.
2004) ("Here, instead of submitting evidence demonstrating mental retardation at the time of
the offense, which took place on October 12, 2000, Anderson submitted evidence of his IQ from
1996.").
31. Tiffany A. Mann, Note, The Supreme Court Exempts Another Class from the Death Pen-
alty: Mentally Retarded Offenders-Atkins v. Virginia, 4 Loy. J. Pun. INT. L. 77. 88 (2003).
32. See, e.g., Schofield v. Holsey, 642 S.E.2d 56, 63 (Ga. 2007) (citing disagreement between
the defendant's and state's experts to support the conclusion that the defendant did not establish
mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt).
33. Bowling v. Commonwealth. 163 S.W.3d 361, 382 (Ky. 2005).
34. Id. (citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996)).
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With respect to timing, in some states, the decision about mental
retardation is made at the punishment phase by the same jury that has
already determined that death is the appropriate punishment.35 The
risk of prejudice is obvious, and several states have taken deliberate
steps in the opposite direction-mandating that the determination of
mental retardation be made by a decisionmaker who has not been
unnecessarily exposed to the circumstances of the offense or the con-
sequences of the factual determination regarding mental retarda-
tion.36 The contrary decision to locate the mental retardation
determination at the punishment phase, apart from its likely prejudi-
cial impact on the assessment, seems patently inefficient. If the deter-
mination of mental retardation is made pretrial, substantial costs
associated with capital litigation can be avoided. The only plausible
account for avoiding a pretrial determination is the state's desire to
confront the decisionmaker with the "cost" of exempting a defendant
from the death penalty in circumstances where they have already
found his criminal behavior to warrant death.
Some jurisdictions have sought to weave the facts of the crime into
the determination itself by treating such facts as relevant to the issue
of adaptive deficits. 37 For example, the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals (CCA) has developed a seven-part inquiry for mental retarda-
tion that explicitly directs the decisionmaker to consider the facts of
the crime. 38 The seventh factor asks, "Putting aside any heinousness
or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did the commission
of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex execution
of purpose?" 39 The Texas test also asks whether the defendant is able
to "hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others' interests. ' 40 This
test significantly departs from those employed by professionals in the
field, which use standardized criteria to detect significantly subaverage
adaptive functioning.41 Although Texas embraces the standard test
35. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
264.3:1.1(C) (2007).
36. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02(B)-(D) (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A
(2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-5 (LexisNexis 2007); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.135 (Lexis-
Nexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 701.10(b) (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.3
(2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-104 (2007).
37. See, e.g., Morrow v. State, 928 So. 2d 315, 320 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
38. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.w.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 8.
41. See AM. Ass'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLAS-
SIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORT 23, 42, 74, 78 (10th ed. 2002) (dividing adaptive function-
ing into three major domains, listing skills within those domains, and defining significantly
subaverage adaptive functioning); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 49 (4th ed. text rev. 2000).
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for mental retardation in its health and safety statute,42 the court-
crafted overlay for assessing deficits in adaptive behavior in capital
cases is not grounded in professional practice or guidelines.
Moreover, the apparent effort of the CCA to mitigate the potential
prejudice by asking the decisionmaker to "put aside" the heinousness
or gruesomeness of the offense is more likely to highlight those facts
than to divert attention from them. The obvious purpose of crafting
such a test is to narrow the class of individuals who can avail them-
selves of the exemption, and the CCA was forthright in explaining
why the familiar test for mental retardation set forth in Texas's health
code should not automatically control capital litigation. According to
the CCA, the definition in the health code might sweep too broadly,
and the court instead sought to "define that level and degree of
mental retardation at which a consensus of Texas citizens would agree
that a person should be exempted from the death penalty. '43 Unsur-
prisingly, Texas courts have rejected virtually every contested claim of
mental retardation in applying this test to persons already sentenced
to death.44
In addition to systemic procedural obstacles, litigation surrounding
the Atkins exemption has been compromised by idiosyncratic proce-
dural irregularities. In one unusual post-Atkins case, an Alabama
court refused to accept the parties' stipulation that the defendant had
mental retardation despite extensive evidence establishing his low IQ
and significant deficits in adaptive behavior. 45 The Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals ultimately reversed that decision, holding that the
"evidence overwhelmingly supports a finding that [the defendant] is
mentally retarded and that he is therefore not eligible for the death
penalty. '46 In another decision, issued just after Atkins, the Alabama
Supreme Court rejected a defendant's claim of mental retardation,
emphasizing the defendant's "articulate statement made to the police
after he was arrested," the fact that the defendant had had a long-time
girlfriend, and the fact that, before shooting the victim, the defendant
had instructed his girlfriend to move out of harm's way. 47 The Ala-
bama Supreme Court reversed his death sentence on other grounds,
paving the way for a new sentencing hearing that resulted in another
42. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003(13) (Vernon 2007).
43. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6.
44. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18-19, Chester v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007) (No. 06-
1616) (stating that the application of Briseno in Texas cases has allowed for relief in only one
contested Texas case).
45. Jackson v. State, 963 So. 2d 150, 152 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006).
46. Id. at 157.
47. Ex parte Smith, No. 1010267, 2003 Ala. LEXIS 79, at *26-28 (Ala. Mar. 14, 2003).
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sentence of death.48 On appeal of the subsequent sentence, the Ala-
bama Court of Criminal Appeals found that the defendant was ineligi-
ble for the death penalty because of his mental retardation. 49
A Mississippi court denied a post-Atkins motion for a hearing on
mental retardation on the ground that the defendant failed to produce
evidence of nonmalingering via the Minnesota Multiphasic Personal-
ity Inventory-II (MMPI-II). 5 0 Despite the defendant's proffered evi-
dence of an IQ of 68 and deficits in adaptive behavior, the Mississippi
Supreme Court ruled that no further proceedings were necessary, be-
cause the defendant had, at best, shown "borderline mental retarda-
tion" and had not offered evidence to demonstrate nonmalingering. 5'
Mississippi's requirement that a defendant establish, as a threshold
matter, nonmalingering via a particular test creates an unnecessary
obstacle to merit review of claims of mental retardation, especially
where a defendant has independently established a basis for supposing
that he has mental retardation.
The most troubling procedural barrier to relief under Atkins is the
imposition of default doctrines, such as statutes of limitations or suc-
cessive petition bars, with the undeniable consequence of permitting
the execution of persons with mental retardation. In Rivera v. Quar-
terman, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's finding that the defendant had mental retardation but
did not grant relief on his claim, because the defendant filed his
habeas petition five days late.5 2 Instead, the panel remanded the case
to the district court to determine whether equitable considerations
justified excusing the defendant's failure to comply with the one-year
statute of limitations under the federal habeas statute. 53 In the state
court proceedings, the defendant had been denied relief on the
ground that he had not established a prima facie case of mental retar-
48. Id. at *30.
49. Smith v. State, No. CR-97-1258, 2006 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 203, at *22-25 (Ala. Crim.
App. Sept. 26, 2006). The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Alabama Supreme Court's
analysis of the claim of mental retardation did not bar further review of the issue, especially in
light of additional evidence introduced at the subsequent trial. Id. at *24. Based on the defen-
dant's IQ of 61 and documented deficits in adaptive behavior, the Court of Criminal Appeals
found the defendant ineligible for the death penalty. Id. at *23-24. Although the subsequent
review by the Court of Criminal Appeals protected Smith from execution, the Alabama Su-
preme Court opinion illustrates the hazards of non-expert analysis of evidence of mental
retardation.
50. Wiley v. State, 890 So. 2d 892, 897 (Miss. 2004).
51. Id. at 896. 898.
52. 505 F.3d 349, 351, 353-54 (5th Cir. 2007). Applicant's motion for authorization did not
alter due date for filing of petition, so the August 11, 2003 filing of the petition was five days late
given that the statute of limitations expired on August 6, 2003.
53. Id. at 363; see generally 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000).
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dation, notwithstanding evidence of his long-standing academic diffi-
culties and expert testimony that, "as an adult, [he] was performing
academically at the level of a 10 year old."'54 The Fifth Circuit found
no clear error in the federal district court's conclusion that the defen-
dant's IQ of 68 and evidence of deficits in adaptive behavior (reflected
in his sleeping outside under his house) established his mental retar-
dation.55 But the appellate court held that the state was entitled to a
determination whether the Atkins claim was barred by the statute of
limitations. 56 Among the considerations the Fifth Circuit thought
should be addressed on remand were whether the defendant was rep-
resented at all times prior to his filing and whether strict application of
limitations periods is justified when a defendant with mental retarda-
tion represents himself.57
The most surprising aspect of the Rivera decision was the Fifth Cir-
cuit's refusal to embrace the defendant's claim that the Eighth
Amendment ban on executing persons with mental retardation
trumps procedural restrictions like the limitations period. Several
courts have wrestled with whether the federal habeas limitations pe-
riod should be read to embrace an "actual innocence" exception. 58 A
logical corollary is whether a defendant who is exempt from the death
penalty as a matter of Eighth Amendment law would likewise over-
come this procedural barrier. It seems clear that no defendant, post-
Simmons, who was under the age of eighteen at the time of the of-
fense, would be deemed to have "forfeited" his Eighth Amendment
claim by failing to raise it in a timely manner. The Fifth Circuit,
though, appears to have endorsed the possibility that a defendant
whose mental retardation is established and judicially acknowledged
might have no judicial protection from execution. 59 If, on remand, the
district court were to find that the limitations period should not have
been equitably tolled, the appellate court will have to address directly
54. Rivera, 505 F.3d at 356 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 362.
56. Id. at 354.
57. Id.
58. Compare Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 599 (6th Cir. 2005) (embracing equitable tolling of
AEDPA's statute of limitations based on actual innocence), and Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799,
808 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating in dicta that actual innocence would justify equitable tolling), with
Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868, 872 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that actual innocence would not
overcome the limitations bar except for newly discovered claims).
59. Rivera, 505 F.3d at 353-54.
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whether the defendant can be executed notwithstanding the court's
conclusion that he is constitutionally ineligible under Atkins.60
II. REFLECTIONS ON PROCEDURAL EVASION OF NEW
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
Despite our earlier concerns about procedural safeguards without
substantive limits, 61 these recent developments have caused us to re-
flect on the risks posed by the declaration of substantive limits without
the enforcement of procedural safeguards. Just like the excessive
proceduralism of the earlier era, the Court's ban on the execution of
persons with mental retardation-unaccompanied by any meaningful
review of the state procedures for implementing the ban-carries with
it the risk of legitimation. The Court's message, to both domestic and
international audiences, was that this country will no longer tolerate
executing persons with mental retardation. Unfortunately, the ab-
sence of procedural safeguards and the very troublesome procedures
adopted in many jurisdictions undercut the plausibility of any such
claim.
Ultimately, the prevalence of state procedures that, whether by de-
sign or implementation, make it difficult to establish mental retarda-
tion limits the scope of the substantive right. Procedures dictate the
scope of substantive rights, and, in this context, the procedures
adopted within various jurisdictions have the effect of redefining the
"consensus" the Court identified. If heavy burdens of proof, stringent
threshold requirements for experts and hearings, and the timing of the
determination of mental retardation systematically screen out close
cases because of the fear of "false positives," the substantive right in
effect becomes a prohibition against executing offenders whose
mental retardation is obvious or indisputable, and offenders without
severe retardation have little meaningful protection. Perhaps the
Court's willingness to cede to the states the authority to craft proce-
dures reflects its view that the substantive right extends only so far-
that there is no clear consensus beyond a prohibition against execut-
ing individuals with severe and demonstrable manifestations of mental
retardation. Indeed, the Court's pronouncement in Atkins that "[n]ot
all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to
fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there
60. In other cases, the Fifth Circuit has rejected the argument that the limitations period
should yield to claims of actual innocence based on evidence of mental retardation. See, e.g., In
re Lewis, 484 F.3d 793, 798 n.20 (5th Cir. 2007).
61. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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is a national consensus" '62 could be read precisely in this way. More
likely, though, is that the Court's embrace of the proportionality limi-
tation was rooted in its understanding that the core clinical definition
of mental retardation was widely shared and that state procedures,
therefore, were unlikely to diverge sharply in their results. On this
latter point, the Court seriously underestimated the extent to which
procedures matter in this context.
It would be ironic if the Court's reliance on Ford v. Wainwright for
charging the states with "the task of developing appropriate ways to
enforce" the federal right were transformed into an unfettered license
to defeat or marginalize the Eighth Amendment prohibition. 63 Ford
itself was a death penalty case that was centrally concerned with the
importance of procedure in protecting an underlying substantive pro-
hibition against certain types of executions. 64 In Ford, the Court an-
nounced the Eighth Amendment ban on the execution of offenders
who are insane at the time of their executions.65 Unlike Atkins, Ford
was not concerned with the culpability of offenders at the time of their
offenses, but rather with the mental state of death row inmates at the
time of their scheduled executions.66 A fractured majority of the
Court discerned a consensus among the states-indeed, a unanimous
one-against executing the insane.67 Justice Powell explained, in a
widely followed concurring opinion, that insanity for these purposes
includes those whose mental state prevents them from being aware of
either their impending execution or the reason for it.68 Florida, the
state in which Ford was sentenced to death, recognized this substan-
tive limitation by statute.69 But the procedure that Florida provided
for assessing a death row inmate's competency to be executed was
wholly nonadversarial, allowing the inmate neither an opportunity to
present relevant evidence nor an opportunity to challenge the state's
evidence. 70 Moreover, the ultimate decision about an inmate's com-
petency to be executed was vested by Florida law not in a neutral fact
finder, but rather in the governor, the head of the very executive
branch that had brought the prosecution in the first place. 71 The Ford
62. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2003).
63. Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986)).
64. 477 U.S. 399.
65. Id. at 409-10.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 409 n.2.
68. Id. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
69. Id. at 412 (majority opinion) (citing FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985 and Supp. 1986)).
70. Ford. 477 U.S. at 412 (majority opinion).
7l. Id.
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Court concluded that this procedural regime failed to meet the re-
quirements of due process and therefore was not "adequate to afford
a full and fair hearing" on the underlying substantive claim of in-
sanity. 72 Thus, when the Atkins Court cited Ford for the proposition
that states should develop procedures for the adjudication of claims of
mental retardation, there is no reason to think that the Court intended
to invite or allow the kind of procedural undermining of the substan-
tive right that we have described above.
Intended or not, however, the current procedural landscape five
years after Atkins threatens vindication of the underlying substantive
right in a way that the Court found intolerable in the analogous Ford
context. What are the implications for our death penalty practices of
this new turn in constitutional regulation-the ringing announcement
of a new substantive limitation on executions coupled with substantial
state limitations on the effective enforcement of that restriction? In
what follows, we consider both the potential consequences and the
way forward from this odd moment of constitutional cognitive
dissonance.
First, the current state of affairs is a humbling lesson in the vein of
"be careful what you wish for. . . ." In our review, two decades after
Furman, of the Court's constitutional regulation of capital punish-
ment, we lambasted the Court for its excessively procedural focus in
crafting its Eighth Amendment doctrine. 73 We argued that the
Court's complicated, but relatively ineffective, procedural require-
ments created the appearance but not the reality of meaningful regu-
lation, and we worried about the "legitimation" effect of such false
assurances. 74 We advocated for more thoroughgoing substantive reg-
ulation of capital punishment, and, in particular, we urged the Court
to reconsider its unwillingness to categorically ban the execution of
juvenile offenders and offenders with mental retardation-as the
Court has now done in Simmons and Atkins.75 However, a survey of
the post-Atkins landscape makes clear that the problem of "legitima-
tion" is not the exclusive province of excessive proceduralism. In-
deed, the announcement of substantive rights that are undermined by
ineffective procedures for implementing or enforcing those rights can
be a particularly pernicious mode of constitutional regulation, because
72. Id. at 418 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). The "full and fair hearing" language is from the
then-prevailing federal habeas statute, which entitled petitioners to an evidentiary hearing de
novo in federal district court, without deference to state fact finding, if the state proceedings
were found-as Florida's were in this case-to be procedurally inadequate.
73. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 1, at 426-38.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 417-18.
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it allows the Court to speak in two voices to two different audiences. 76
Those "in the know" realize that the substantive right runs only as far
as its effective enforcement; thus, state court prosecutors can continue
to seek the death penalty for offenders with probable mental retarda-
tion in cases in which they predict that the defendants will be unable
to marshal the resources or bear the procedural burdens of proving
their mental condition. For the sophisticated, the procedural regime
redefines the very nature of the right at issue; close cases of mental
retardation or cases in which the procedural burdens cannot be met by
the defendant become simply cases of "no" mental retardation,
whatever the fact of the matter might be. The less sophisticated gen-
eral public, however, is likely to accept at face value that the United
States no longer executes persons with mental retardation and may
believe or be persuaded that this country's death penalty practices are
less problematic than they really are.
The divergence of perception from reality is particularly intractable
in the context of mental retardation because of the difficulty of prov-
ing conclusively that "real" cases of mental retardation are being sys-
tematically excluded by procedural hurdles. The essential faith that
our criminal justice system would not permit the execution of an inno-
cent person, for example, is susceptible to post-trial (and even posthu-
mous) scientific disproof. The power of disproving such a comforting
illusion can be seen most clearly, perhaps, in Illinois, where the exon-
eration of more than a dozen death row inmates led Governor George
Ryan to grant mass clemency to the state's death row in 2003. 77 Simi-
larly, the current controversy over lethal injection protocols illustrates
the way in which science can quickly undermine a too-facile consen-
sus-in this case, that the dominant lethal injection protocol is both
painless and humane. 78 Proof of mental retardation is another matter.
Persons with mental retardation often become skilled at hiding their
76. See generally Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?
Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996) (raising legitimation concerns about
the way that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts cut back on the Warren Court's criminal proce-
dure revolution by undermining remedies for Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment violations
while leaving relatively intact that scope of the underlying substantive rights).
77. See generally Rob Warden, Illinois Death Penalty Reform: How It Happened, What It
Promises, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381 (2005) (describing the events leading up to Gover-
nor Ryan's actions and the death penalty reform efforts that followed).
78. See Note, A New Test for Evaluating Eighth Amendment Challenges to Lethal Injections,
120 HARV. L. REV. 1301, 1304 (2007) (describing the galvanizing role of a study published in the
medical journal, The Lancet, which found that anesthesia administered during lethal injections
was inadequate). The Court has granted certiorari to consider a constitutional challenge to the
dominant lethal injection protocol. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 372 (2007).
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disability, 79 and experts frequently disagree about whether a defen-
dant meets the criteria for a formal diagnosis of mental retardation.80
The highly contested and repeated litigation of the proper diagnoses
of Johnny Paul Penry and Daryl Atkins, the two capital defendants
whose cases led to the new constitutional ban, reveals just how diffi-
cult it is to reach a conclusive determination of mental retardation,
even in cases in which there is strong and long-standing evidence of
serious cognitive impairment. Thus, the substance-procedure divide
may pose a particularly potent danger of legitimation in this context.
Despite real reasons to worry that the Court's decision in Atkins
might legitimate and thus stabilize our death penalty practices, there
are also reasons to see in Atkins the seeds of much more fundamental
change-perhaps even abolition. The Court's new method for assess-
ing evolving standards of decency-laid out first in Atkins and elabo-
rated in Simmons-now references expert, religious, and world
opinion in addition to state legislative practices.8 ' Such a privileging
of elite opinion-which is always far more skeptical of capital punish-
ment than general public opinion-will inevitably be far more solici-
tous of substantive regulation and limitation of death penalty practices
than the Court's prior focus on wholly "objective" evidence of state
legislation and actual jury verdicts. Indeed, the Court's decision in
Atkins appears to be its first to find an American criminal practice
excessive in the absence of an overwhelming legislative consensus
against the practice. Thus, Atkins has opened the path not only to
other proportionality limitations on the reach of the death penalty,
but also to the prospect of judicial abolition of the death penalty itself.
After Atkins, the fact that numerous jurisdictions have the death
penalty on the books appears to be less dispositive of the death pen-
alty's consistency with prevailing societal norms. Hence, in the post-
Atkins era, incremental movement away from capital punishment
might serve as evidence of community standards evolving toward
greater decency, even in the absence of overwhelming legislative re-
jection of the practice. The wide range of potentially relevant evi-
dence might include some or all of the following: declining death
sentencing and execution rates; declining capital charging rates; state
79. See James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 430 (1985).
80. See Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a Cate-
gorical Exemption for Juveniles from Capital Punishment, 33 N.M. L. REV. 207, 220 (2003) (citing
"the dueling experts" on the question of mental retardation in Penry as illustrative of the "con-
siderable disagreement among mental health professionals" in diagnosing mental retardation).
81. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2003); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575
(2005).
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and local moratoria to reform or study death penalty practices; new
legislative limitations on the scope of the penalty (even in the absence
of wholesale abolition); partial moves toward abolition (such as the
vote of a single house of a bicameral legislature);8 2 increased use of
executive clemency; or further consolidation of public, expert, or
world opinion. In a country in which the distribution of executions is
already "lumpy"-two-thirds of the executions since Furman have oc-
curred in only five states83-it is increasingly plausible to view execu-
tions as a marginalized practice, which may be enough under Atkins to
outlaw it entirely. 84
If Atkins is continually procedurally undermined, how are we to
weigh its potential legitimating effect against its radical potential as
the key to nationwide abolition? One answer, of course, is that the
proof will be in the pudding-only time will tell whether the fruit that
Atkins bears will be lotus-like (engendering apathy) or galvanizing.
Alternatively, we might observe that any weighing should consider the
fact that the Court's failure to address the varied state procedural ap-
proaches toward implementing (or defeating) the substantive limita-
tion announced in Atkins probably facilitated its effort to discern a
national consensus in the first instance. Had the Atkins Court ex-
amined more closely some of the underlying statutory and judicial ob-
stacles to relief in the states it counted as "prohibiting" the execution
of offenders with mental retardation, the Court would have been less
able to support its claim of a firm emerging norm against the practice.
Georgia, the first state to reject the practice of executing persons with
mental retardation, imposes the highest burden in the country-re-
quiring defendants to prove their mental retardation beyond a reason-
able doubt. This imposition of an extraordinary burden on defendants
represents an important qualification to Georgia's rejection of the
practice, and by not engaging the burden-of-proof issue in the Atkins
82. Other evidence of partial or tentative abolition might be the New York legislature's failure
to reinstate the death penalty after the state's highest court struck it down because of a remedia-
ble technical defect on state constitutional grounds in 2004. See Patrick D. Healy, Death Penalty
Is Blocked by Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at B1. Similarly, the New Hampshire
legislature's abolition of the death penalty that was vetoed by Democratic Governor Jeanne
Shaheen could be considered evidence of partial or tentative abolition. See John Kifner, A State
Votes to End Its Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2000, at A16.
83. Texas, Virginia, Oklahoma, Missouri, and Florida have carried out 719 of the 1,099 execu-
tions in the United States since 1976, when the death penalty was reinstated after Furman. Texas
alone has carried out 405 of the executions. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Number of Executions
by State and Region Since 1976, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=186
(last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
84. We explore how an argument for abolition using the new Eighth Amendment methodol-
ogy developed in Atkins might succeed in Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Beginning
of the End?, in THE ROAD TO ABOLITION (Charles Ogletree & Austin Sarat eds., 2008).
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opinion, the Court was able to offer a somewhat more persuasive ac-
count of the national consensus against the practice. Thus, it is possi-
ble that the Court's recognition of the existence of the underlying
consensus actually required turning a blind eye toward state procedu-
ral practices, at least at the moment of announcing the consensus.
In the same vein, the Court's decision to regulate substance but not
procedure might facilitate future substantive regulation by lessening
the costs of the Court's interventions. The Court's efforts to regulate
state death penalty practices are highly contested, and the Court's
willingness to cede implementation of its substantive regulation might
lessen the opposition to its interventions. Unlike its prohibition
against the execution of juveniles, the existence of procedural barriers
allows for a gradualist approach to the ban on executing persons with
mental retardation. Indeed, some of the more significant barriers to
enforcement involve the retroactive application of the ban, and the
Court's deregulation of procedures alleviates some of the costs-as
perceived by the states-of a fully retroactive prohibition. In this
way, the Court's deregulation of state procedural regimes and simulta-
neous announcement of new, sweeping substantive prohibitions under
the Eighth Amendment is analogous to the Warren Court's embrace
of nonretroactivity principles during its broader criminal procedure
revolution: both techniques have allowed the Court to move faster
and reach farther in promoting institutional change than it might oth-
erwise have been able to do.8 5
The foregoing is not meant to suggest that we should accept proce-
dural deregulation as either benign or inevitable. Rather, as time pro-
gresses and we move further from the announcement of consensus
into an extended period of implementation of the new ban, the help-
fulness of procedural deregulation (in discerning consensus and al-
lowing gradual acclimation to the new substantive regime) fades,
while the danger of legitimation grows. What should be the strategy
of capital litigants in this extended implementation period? Is it possi-
ble or likely that the Court will revisit the procedural issues and begin
a process of procedural regulation?
The Court's recent decision in Panetti v. Quarterman suggests an
answer in a closely analogous context. 86 Panetti involved a refinement
of the substantive ban on the execution of the insane announced in
85. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1734 (1991) ("Even the Warren Court might have
hesitated to move as far and as fast as it did if each decision recognizing a 'new' right required
opening the prison gates for all victims of past violations.").
86. 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007).
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Ford. Panetti, a Texas capital defendant who had long suffered from
serious mental illness, refused to continue taking his antipsychotic
medication and began to suffer from serious psychotic delusions.87
Examined by mental health experts as his execution date approached,
Panetti stated that he knew that he had been convicted of killing two
people and that the state of Texas claimed that this was the reason
that it was seeking to execute him. 88 But, according to expert testi-
mony offered on Panetti's behalf, Panetti was convinced that this
stated reason was a sham and that the real reason Texas sought to
execute him was "to stop him from preaching"-part of his psychotic
delusions about religious persecution.89 The Court held that the Fifth
Circuit's test for competence to be executed-which required only
that the inmate be able to state that he understood the fact of his
impending execution and the reason for it-was too restrictive, be-
cause it failed to consider whether the inmate's understanding was ra-
tional.90 The Panetti Court thus expanded the Ford prohibition
beyond its narrowest literal terms.
The Panetti decision, however, contained a significant procedural di-
mension as well. The Court held that Panetti was denied "an ade-
quate opportunity to submit expert evidence in response to the report
filed by the court-appointed experts." 91 The Court did not clarify the
kind of opportunity the Texas courts should have offered Panetti; it
held simply that what had occurred in the case was inadequate. 92 The
Court made clear that it was reserving for another day "whether other
procedures, such as the opportunity for discovery or for the cross-ex-
amination of witnesses, would in some cases be required under the
Due Process Clause. ' 93 While this decision can be criticized for being
excessively noncommittal, 94 that very minimalism might actually serve
as a model for how to take the first steps from procedural deregula-
tion to regulation. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the five-to-four
Court was modest and incremental: it identified a set of procedural
inadequacies with great particularity (focusing with minute precision
on what the Texas trial court said and did in each interaction with
87. Id. at 2849.
88. Id. at 2851.
89. Id. at 2859.
90. Id. at 2862.
91. Id. at 2857.
92. See Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2857.
93. Id. at 2858.
94. See Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. Quarterman: Is There a "Rational Understanding" of the
Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 285, 288 (2007)
(criticizing the Panetti opinion for "how little it manages to say" in addressing the questions
before it).
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defense counsel), and it declared this narrow and extreme set of facts
beyond the constitutional pale, without attempting to define the gen-
eral contours of constitutionally appropriate procedures. 95 Such an
approach allows for state variation in procedural regimes, while pro-
viding a mechanism both for policing outliers and, more generally, for
signaling that the Court is scrutinizing procedure as well as substance.
Panetti can serve as a template for challenges to some of the more
extreme procedural impediments to vindicating Atkins's substantive
ban-such as Georgia's placement of the burden on a capital defen-
dant to prove mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt or Texas
courts' consideration of the facts of the underlying crime as highly
probative of a defendant's lack of mental retardation. If some of the
more extreme procedural burdens to vindicating Atkins claims are
winnowed out, the gap between Atkins's substantive promise and the
reality of our death penalty practices will begin to narrow, and there
will be greater reason to accept with less irony the Court's claim that
our country's capital practices are indeed "evolving" toward greater
"decency."
95. 127 S. Ct. at 2856-57.
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